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1 | INTRODUCTION
What role should deliberation play in our understanding of virtuous agency? A common thought
maintains that it is essential. It is essential both to our ability to appropriately work through inconsis-
tencies in our moral beliefs and judgments, and to our ability to understand, and so navigate, the
complexities of moral life. Granted, there is disagreement about how exactly to understand delibera-
tion's role in all this—the basic picture, however, is widely endorsed.1 But is this position tenable?
Even a little reflection reveals that many virtuous acts proceed without deliberation. Recent work in
moral psychology brings further trouble. Drawing on empirical research, this work suggests emo-
tions and other automatic mechanisms—not deliberation—drive practical decision making: what
1 For a representative sample, see Brink and Nelkin (2013), Korsgaard (2009), Kennett and Fine (2009), Wolf (1990), Watson
(1982), and Frankfurt (1971).
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seems like genuine deliberation is really just post hoc rationalization (Doris, 2015; Haidt, 2001). If
these skeptical worries are correct, then there is little—if any—role for deliberation in thought and
action, much less virtuous thought and action.
Against this backdrop, the skill model of virtuous agency has much appeal.2 This model takes
the fluid performances of artisans, athletes, and musicians as the paradigm of excellence in human
agency. It then notes that though these individuals perform automatically, without contemplation or
reflection, they can do so only because of the conscious thought they have put into learning their
skills. Thus, the skill model suggests we can vindicate deliberation while also accommodating the
empirical work that underlies the skeptic's claims about the automatic nature of virtuous agency.
But while tempting, the skill model cannot substantiate our commonsense thoughts about the
importance of deliberation for virtue. To show this, I focus on Julia Annas's recent proposal. As we
will see, her version of the skill model seems particularly well-equipped to address skeptical worries
about deliberation's significance. But, as we will also see, the progress her proposal makes comes at
the cost of an implausible account of the psychology of the virtuous agent—one that overstates
deliberation's role for the development of virtue and understates its contribution once virtue has been
acquired.3 While recognizing the limitations of Annas's proposal is important on its own, this critical
investigation has larger significance: it enriches our understanding of the moral psychology of virtu-
ous agents. More specifically, we will see that developing a better response to the skeptic requires
giving greater attention to emotion and, in particular, to a distinctive form of anxiety. Recognizing
this not only helps us better understand deliberation's central role, but also reveals where the skeptic
goes wrong. In short, deliberation is essential to our ability to work through difficult decisions. But
we can engage in it only because of emotions like anxiety that function to both signal that we face a
difficult choice—a choice that automatic mechanisms alone cannot address—and initiate the reason-
ing that helps bring good practical judgment. The result is a more compelling skill-based account of
deliberation's place in virtuous thought and action.
2 | THE CHALLENGE
While the claim that deliberation is essential to virtue can be fleshed out in many ways, the most
plausible versions have two features: they tie virtuous agency not to actual conscious deliberation,
but to the capacity for it, and they aim to provide accounts of what virtuous decision making
amounts to for ordinary humans, not perfect or ideal agents.4 Much of the appeal of this “delibera-
tionist” position lies in the thought that deliberative capacities—what underlies things like inquiry,
reflection, reasoning, and reassessment—are essential not just to human agency in general, but also
to the exemplification of virtuous thought and action.5 Intuitively, it is (in part) because normal
adults can consciously assess, revise, and act for reasons that we view them as agents. Moreover,
we take our development as agents—our ability to become virtuous—to go hand in hand with the
2 While the skill model is often defended by those working in the Aristotelian tradition (e.g., Annas, 2011; Bloomfield, 2000; Drey-
fus & Dreyfus, 1991; Foot, 1978; Stichter, 2015), it also has broader appeal (e.g., Kennett & Fine, 2009; Railton, 2009).
3 As will become clearer below, while some of the concerns that I raise about Annas's account have been noted by others, the critical
portion of my argument is novel in situating her view (and the associated criticisms) within the context of recent empirically moti-
vated skepticism about deliberation.
4 Accounts of ideal agency can be found in (e.g. Rawls (1971, pp. 416–424) and McDowell (1998). But they have familiar problems.
For instance, given the high degree of idealization these proposals involve, how can agents of this sort serve as normative standards
for ordinary human agents (e.g., Doris, 2015; Enoch, 2006)?
5 In what follows, I will be using “deliberation” and “epistemic behaviors” to refer to this broad suite of capacities, not just (con-
scious) reasoning.
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development of our deliberative capacities. Similarly, for our responsibility intuitions: it is (partly)
because of our capacity for deliberation—our ability to recognize and work through deficiencies in
our beliefs and goals—that we take ourselves to be subject to praise, blame, and an expectation to
become better. So, for instance, David Brink and Dana Nelkin maintain that
[o]ur paradigms of responsible agents are normal mature adults with certain sorts of
capacities. We do not treat brutes or small children as responsible agents. Brutes and
small children both act intentionally, but they act on their strongest desires or, if they
exercise deliberation and impulse control, it is primarily instrumental reasoning in the
service of fixed aims. By contrast, we suppose, responsible agents must be normatively
competent. They must not simply act on their strongest desires, but be capable of step-
ping back from their desires, evaluating them, and acting for good reasons. This
requires responsible agents to be able to recognize and respond to reasons for action
(Brink & Nelkin, 2013, p. 292).6
Thus, making sense of what it is to be a virtuous agent seems to require vindicating the importance
of deliberation for human thinking and doing.7
The significance of this vindicatory project is further highlighted by two empirically motivated
lines of skepticism that emerge from recent work by Jonathan Haidt (2001) and John Doris (2015).8
First, research on dual-process theories of mind suggests practical judgment starts from, and is
largely driven by, automatic—not conscious—mental processes. More specifically, the skeptic starts
by drawing on work indicating that there are two general types of mental processing: Type 1 pro-
cesses that are inter alia quick, effortless, unconscious, and (often) affectively valenced; Type 2 pro-
cesses that are inter alia slow, effortful, conscious, and (largely) affectively neutral. He then points
to research suggesting that framing effects and seemingly irrelevant situational features can bring
significant changes in one's subsequent practical judgments (e.g., foul odors bring harsher judgments
of responsibility; circling “we” rather than “I” in a passage gets people to avow more communitarian
values). But if trivial situational features like these can have such significant effects on our practical
judgments, then it is hard to see how deliberation could be playing much of a role. A better explana-
tion, says the skeptic, is that practical judgment is the product of Type 1 processes.
The second worry comes from work on confabulation. This research indicates that we are gener-
ally unaware of the causes of our behavior—be it picking up a certain object or making a particular
practical judgment. But our lack of awareness does not stop us from confidently offering (typically
false) explanations for why we did what we did. The skeptic takes these findings to undermine the
thought that our reason-giving behavior amounts to genuine deliberation: given our tendency to con-
fabulate, for all we know, our “deliberation” is nothing more than a post hoc rationalization of a
judgment we have already made.
The overall picture of agency suggested by this work is quite disconcerting. These skeptical
worries, if well-founded, reveal that deliberation does not—perhaps cannot—play the role in deci-
sion making and agency proposed by deliberationists. Importantly, the skeptic need not claim that
we never engage in genuine deliberation. Rather, he need only maintain that the deliberation we
6 For similar claims, see the references in note 1.
7 Some will resist the claim that deliberation is essential on the grounds that nondeliberative agency displays all the intelligence and
reasons-responsiveness that we need in order to account for virtue and its development (e.g., Stanley, 2011 and, perhaps, Railton,
2014). However, while proposals like this point to middle-ground between Haidt/Doris-style skepticism and a vindication of delibera-
tion, they nonetheless come at a cost to the commonsense thoughts about deliberation's role noted in the text. Thus, before going this
route, we should investigate the prospects for a vindication of deliberation's role.
8 Because I take these skeptical worries to be familiar, my discussion will be brief.
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engage in fails to plays an interesting—much less essential—role in shaping virtuous thought and
action (e.g., Doris, 2015, pp. 22–23). But if that is correct, if there is no interesting or essential role
for deliberation, then much of what we take to be distinctive about humans as rational and moral
agents is threatened: our intuitions to the contrary, deliberative capacities are irrelevant for things
like identifying normal adults (but not children or brutes) as agents, understanding what is involved
in becoming virtuous, and making sense of responsibility. Such revision to ordinary thought is quite
radical. As Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine observe:
If it should turn out that human agency is of the minimal kind suggested by [the
skeptic,] then our moral concepts will lack application, and moral discourse and prac-
tice will be systematically in error since they are irreducibly predicated on the assump-
tion that we are reason responders [i.e., creatures have the capacity to respond to
reasons as reasons and to guide their behavior accordingly] (Kennett & Fine, 2009,
p. 85, emphasis added; also Tiberius, 2013, p. 223; Sauer, 2011).
In light of all this, one should feel the force of the skeptic's challenge: Can there be a substantive
place for deliberation given the empirical arguments that undergird the skeptic's objections? More
specifically, if the deliberationist is to vindicate our pre-theoretical beliefs about the importance of
deliberation for virtuous agency, she must (i) establish that deliberation plays a substantive and
essential role in good practical decision making and agency, while (ii) granting that practical judg-
ment is a process that starts from, and is largely driven by, automatic processes.9 In what follows, I
take up this challenge.
3 | THE SKILL MODEL OF VIRTUOUS AGENCY
As we noted, in the face of the above skeptical challenge, skill-based models of virtuous agency
have much appeal. These proposals take the fluid performances of accomplished athletes, musicians,
and craftspersons as the paradigm of human excellence and use them as a model for understanding
virtuous agency more generally. This move is significant. If we can understand virtuous thought and
action as akin to skilled performances, then we have a model of agency that can secure an essential,
but limited, role for deliberation in our understanding of virtue. After all, musical and athletic skills
require conscious effort to acquire; but once one has become proficient, one can perform automati-
cally, without conscious thought or reflection. Thus, the focus on skills gives us a proposal that is
both applicable to ordinary humans and well-equipped to answer the challenge that proponents of
deliberation face.
To give this claim substance, I focus on Julia Annas's recent proposal. There are several reasons
for this. Not only is Annas explicit about wanting to secure an essential place for deliberation in vir-
tuous agency (2011, chap. 1), but she also wants her account of virtue to be something ordinary
human agents can attain (pp. 30–32).10 Moreover, and as we will see, in comparison with other ver-
sions of the skill model, Annas's account emphasizes features of virtue and its development that
make for a particularly forceful reply to the skeptic.
9 One might reasonably hold that responding to the skeptics need not involve granting (all) the data on which their arguments rest
(e.g., Jacobson, 2012; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003). While I am sympathetic to this move, it is worth seeing if the skeptics' conclusions
can be resisted even if we grant them their starting place.
10 While Annas is primarily concerned to give an account of virtue applicable to ordinary humans, she acknowledges that there is a
notion of virtue as a regulative ideal—though ordinary humans can never secure this “full” virtue, it is something they can “aspire” to
(pp. 64–65). Following Annas, my focus will be on the primary, nonidealized notion of virtue.
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Turning to details, according to Annas, there is a strong analogy between the development and
exemplification of skills and the development and exemplification of virtues:
the kind of practical reasoning found in the development and exercise of virtue is like
the kind of reasoning that we find in the development and exercise of practical exper-
tise. … [V]irtue is habituated, built up over time and from experience by a process of
learning…. The virtuous person acts by way of immediate response to situations, but
in a way that exhibits the practical intelligence of the skilled craftsperson or athlete
(Annas, 2011, p. 169).
As this quote suggests, Annas's proposal has two elements. First, like a skill, virtuous agency is
learned. In particular, to count as the form of learning necessary for the acquisition of skills and vir-
tues, one's development must be something that meets two conditions: its development that
(i) proceeds via explicit instruction whereby one comes to recognize the reasons for doing one thing
rather than another, and that (ii) involves one exhibiting a drive to aspire. As she explains, this
“drive” consists in the combination of three inter-related motivations: a desire to understand why the
teacher does what she does, a desire to be able to execute the skill in a self-directed way (rather than
exhibiting a mere mimicking capacity), and a desire to improve (pp. 17–18).
Second, and again like a skill, once the underlying capacities have been acquired, the subsequent
exemplification of virtue is automatic, but intelligent; virtuous thought and action is akin to the
“flow” experiences that Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (1991) has used to characterize optimal human
performance. Such performances are paradigmatic examples of practical intelligence: they are cases
where one demonstrates the reasons responsiveness that is characteristic of virtuous agency, but
does so without consciously deliberating. As Annas explains, ‘[h]onest actions will be experienced
by the mature honest person in the “flow” way; however complex and hard to navigate the circum-
stances are, there is no felt resistance to acting honestly’ (p. 75). The agency of both the skilled and
the virtuous is ‘unmediated by deliberation’ and ‘unimpeded by frustration and inner conflict’
(pp. 71–73).
To see how Annas's proposal helps address our challenge, first consider her account of learning
and development. Unlike versions of the skill model that take learning to typically involve explicit
instruction that appeals to reasons (e.g., Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1991; Stichter, 2015), Annas's account
requires it. As such, she can specify an essential role for deliberation. Moreover, because Annas
takes virtuous agency to be on par with the flow experiences of athletes and artisans, she can capture
the data underlying the empirically motivated skepticism. After all, since the exemplification of vir-
tue once acquired is a flow experience, it is action that is both automatic and intelligent. So she can
maintain that virtuous agency is driven by automatic processes, while still insisting that it is not just
mindless habit. Finally, because developing one's agential capacities is, like becoming a skilled
musician, a process that requires developing understanding via explanations that appeal to underly-
ing reasons, one will be able to accurately explain why one did what one did (p. 20). Because other
versions of the skill model avoid tying virtuous action to the ability to provide such explanations
(e.g., Bloomfield, 2000; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1991), we again see an advantage in Annas's proposal:
given her explanation requirement, she seems particularly well-placed to respond to the skeptic's
charge that what appears to be “reasoning” is nothing but post hoc rationalizations.11
11 To be clear, my claim is that Annas's proposal appears better equipped to answer the skeptic's challenge. Other skill-based
accounts might be more plausible all things considered—a possibility I take up in §7.
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4 | TWIN PROBLEMS WITH ANNAS'S PROPOSAL
With this understanding of Annas's skill model in hand, I will argue that her proposal offers an
account of the moral psychology of the virtuous agent that is over intellectualized in its picture of
how virtue is acquired, but under intellectualized in its explanation of the role for deliberation once
virtue has been acquired. But since Annas's version of the skill model seems to be the one that's best
equipped to answer the skeptic, the result will be real cause for concern regarding the ability of the
skill model to provide a response to the challenge from §2. The balance of the paper develops a bet-
ter way forward.
Problem 1: Over Intellectualized. Annas takes skill and, by analogy, virtue acquisition to require
learning that involves both (a) explicit instruction that appeals to reasons and (b) a drive to aspire.
As we saw, it is this intellectualized account of learning that secures an essential role for conscious
deliberation in virtuous thought and action. Thus, her proposal would be in trouble if it were possi-
ble for individuals to develop sophisticated skills without either (a) or (b). On this front, things like
language acquisition seem problematic: while learning a language might be facilitated by explicit
instruction and a drive to aspire, neither appears to be necessary as evidenced by emersion methods.
Moreover, even if we grant that language learning requires instruction (Annas, 2008, p. 23), why
think it must be the highly intellectualized learning Annas's account demands—namely, instruction
that highlights the underlying reasons for (say) using one verb-form rather than another?12 Similarly,
consider the culinary arts. One can become a skilled cook even if one's talent results, not from
explicit instruction that appeals to reasons, but rather from a combination of mimicking others
(e.g., recipes, cooking shows) and one's own trial-and-error efforts.
In response, Annas might maintain that the kind of learning relevant to the development of
skilled and virtuous agency is learning that brings a true appreciation of the underlying reasons—it
is learning that allows the individual to explain why she did what she did. Without this ability to
explain, we have a mere “knack,” not genuine practical expertise (2011, pp. 19–20; Annas, 2008).
But this move comes at a big cost. Granted, by requiring the rich understanding that would allow
one to explain why one acted as one did, Annas can rule out skills acquired from trial-and-error or
emersion as counterexamples. However, this explanatory requirement also appears to rule out the
artisans, athletes, and musicians that she points to as paradigmatic instances of individuals who have
acquired their expertise in the right way: as accomplished as they are, they are often unable to pro-
vide explanations for what they have done.13 In short, in going this way, Annas ends up undermin-
ing her ability to use these skilled experts as a model for virtue.14
12 Consider that novelists like Mark Twain and William Faulkner dropped out of school at (respectively) age 12 and 14. They seem
to be living examples of literary exemplars despite (presumably) lacking either the explicit instruction or drive for understanding that
Annas takes as essential.
13 Brownstein (2014) develops an argument of this sort against Annas. One of his examples is the following quote from the Hall of
Fame running back Walter Payton: “people ask me about this move or that move, but I don't know why I did something. I just did
it.” Also see Bloomfield (2000), and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1991).
14 At this point, Annas might try to draw on empirical work suggesting that skilled athletes can explain their actions
(e.g., Christensen, Bicknell, McIlwain, & Sutton, 2015, regarding expert mountain bikers; Sutton, 2007, on professional cricket bat-
ters). But there is reason to be concerned about the effectiveness of this move. First, showing that some skilled athletes can articulate
their reasons does not mean all can—witness Walter Payton. So, unless more can be said, the objection in the text stands. Second, it
is unclear whether this empirical research even does the work Annas needs it to do. More specifically, the research supports the claim
that (some) skilled athletes display a distinctive capacity for higher-order, top-down cognitive control. So it provides evidence that
these individuals rely on Type 2 processing. But since not all Type 2 processing is conscious (e.g., Price & Norman, 2008), it is
unclear whether we get evidence for the further claim that Annas needs—namely, that skilled athletes can articulate their reasons for
doing what they did.
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Stepping back, we get a more general lesson. If the practical expertise of these paradigms of
human excellence fail Annas's explanation requirement for learning, then why think skill or virtue
acquisition must be so intellectualized? It appears that while Annas may be right that skills (and so
virtues) are acquired more efficiently when they come via explicit instruction and a drive to aspire,
she errs in thinking these features are essential to the learning process. If we are to vindicate deliber-
ation, we need to look elsewhere.
Problem 2: Under Intellectualized. As we noted, Annas takes the harmonious, automatic perfor-
mances of athletes and craftspersons as evidence that virtuous thought and action will be similarly
free of unease, struggle, and deliberation. Moreover, this strong analogy with flow experiences pro-
vides a forceful reply to the skeptic: if virtuous action is both automatic and intelligent, then there is
no need to give—or substantiate—a role for deliberation once virtue has been acquired. But Annas
recognizes that this psychological picture may seem dubious in light of our personal experiences
with difficult (moral) choices and so she identifies two ways that unease, struggle, and deliberation
can be consistent with virtuous agency.
First, there are cases where the virtuous agent struggles and feels uneasy because she's faced
with challenges she cannot control: she, say, gives generously but feels regret and discomfort
because she cannot do more—there are just too many who need help. Such unease is consistent with
virtue because it results from difficult external circumstances, rather than an internal conflict in
desires and values (e.g., she gives but regrets her self-interested resistance to giving more) (p. 78).
Second, there are cases where the virtuous agent must think through a complicated situation. Delib-
eration in these cases is consistent with virtuous agency because the ‘activity is harmonious in the
sense that there is no disruption of intent’ (p. 77); like a skilled surgeon who comes across an unex-
pected complication, one's reflection proceeds ‘easily and without internal struggle’ (Annas, 2008,
pp. 32–33).
However, while Annas is right that an account of virtue applicable to ordinary human agents
needs to make room for cases like these, virtuous human agents do—and should—feel uneasy and
deliberate more often than Annas's account allows. To better draw this out, consider the
following:
Refugees. You provide assistance to a group of refugees and do so from sympathy.
But your decision is a source of unease, not because you feel regret, but rather because
your decision to give so much strains your other goals and values (e.g., regarding your
family)—it gets you thinking about whether you are making the correct choice.
Intuitively, this is an instance of virtuous action, not merely an action that brings morally correct
results. You do not just provide assistance from sympathy for the refugees but—through your
unease—you evince a broader emotional attunement. Moreover, the anxiety you feel about your
decision, and the deliberation this provokes, reflects an admirable form of concern: a sensitivity
that manifests your appreciation of the significance and complexity of the decision you are
making.
But notice: the refugee case provides an instance of virtue that is at odds with the psychological
picture Annas presents. In particular, we have virtuous agency that involves both internal struggle
and disruptive deliberation: not only are you concerned about whether your sizable contribution will
put too much strain on your other commitments, but this concern interrupts your decision making—
it gets you to pause and assess things more closely. Moreover, and in a more normative vein, the
case reveals the value we place in someone who, at times, not only feels uneasy or anxious in the
face of difficult and novel decisions, but who—as a result of this unease—stops to reassess the
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situation at hand.15 To be clear, I do not deny that the unease- and deliberation-free agency of the
above surgeon example is admirable; my point is that such cases do not exhaust our understanding
of virtuous agency. As the refugee example reveals, the virtuous agent is someone who feels unease
about how to act and who reassesses her plans as her situation becomes less familiar. An individual
who finds herself in a novel or difficult situation like this—but who isn't worried and doesn't
reassess—strikes us as flawed or deficient in an important way: like someone devoid of anger (and
the associated drives) in the face of a heinous crime.
Annas might respond that this case only reveals the rather obvious fact that some individuals are
more virtuous than others: while it might make sense for an internally conflicted individual to feel
uncertain and deliberate, a more virtuous person would not be conflicted—though problems may
arise that require reflection, the virtuous individual will proceed fluidly and without disruption
(p. 77).16 However, so long as we are focusing on a notion of virtuous agency applicable to
ordinary—not ideal—agents, it is hard to see how this move helps. After all, for any level of actual
human development, there will be situations where even the most experienced individuals face novel
situations—situations quite unlike what they have seen before. When this happens, past experience
cannot guide automatic action. Thus, one must have the ability to recognize that one faces a novel
situation in a way that prompts one to pause and consider whether one's initial inclination about
what to do is correct. What makes the unease of someone in the refugee case admirable is that such
a person evinces this attunement—her worry signals a novel or difficult situation and prompts
reassessment.
Moreover, the claim that skilled/virtuous action involves a tendency to feel uneasy and reassess
in the face of uncertainty is supported by empirical research on the decision-making of experienced
firefighters (Klein, 1999). For these individuals, initial decisions about how to fight a fire come
automatically based on intuitive assessments grounded in past experience. But unnoticed features or
changing conditions can reveal problems in the initial plan. These anomalies can in turn spark ‘dis-
comfit’ that signals trouble and motivates reflection, reassessment, and changes in plans (p. 33). So
while Annas is right that the expert is attuned to ‘what is happening and respond[s] appropriately to
feedback’ (p. 77), she is mistaken in thinking that this process is always harmonious, easy, or free
of disruption. In fact, the firefighter research suggests unease, disruption, and reassessment will
sometimes be exactly what is needed.
The Upshot. One might think the above difficulties would be avoided by versions of the skill
model that are both less intellectualized in their account of learning and less restrictive regarding the
role of deliberation once skill/virtue has been acquired. Though we will return to this possibility in
§7, we have already seen that these alternative proposals lack the resources needed to respond to the
skeptic (§3). But there is more to our critical investigation than just these negative conclusions: we
have also gained new insights into the moral psychology of the virtuous. The refugee case and the
firefighter research suggest that virtuous thought and action involves both a tendency to feel uneasy
about how to act as one's situation grows increasingly unfamiliar, and a tendency for that unease to
prompt a reassessment of one's initial intentions. I take this, in turn, to motivate the idea that a dis-
tinctive variety of anxiety—anxiety about practical decisions—is central to a plausible account of
the psychology that undergirds virtuous agency: it is an emotion that gets us deliberating about
novel and difficult situations—situations where automatic processes alone are unable to provide
15 This point has been recognized by others: Arpaly and Schroeder (2014, pp. 241–245), Slote (2014, pp. 175–176), and Stohr
(2003). I say more about this in Kurth (2018a).
16 Foot (1978) also makes a move of this sort.
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guidance about what to do. In what follows, I sketch a picture of this practical anxiety and show
how it allows us to answer our challenge.
5 | PRACTICAL ANXIETY: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES
5.1 | A primer on anxiety
To understand what practical anxiety is and how it can help vindicate deliberation, we need some
background. Anxiety, as a general psychological phenomenon, is an emotional response to uncer-
tainty about possible threats or challenges.17 Fleshing this out, we can see anxiety as an emotion that
integrates two capacities that are concerned with problematic levels of uncertainty. First, on the
input side, anxiety brings an important form of awareness: it functions as an alarm or signal that
automatically identifies, and directs our attention toward, potential threats. As the psychologist
Andrew Mathews explains, anxiety brings ‘an automatic processing bias, initiated prior to aware-
ness, but serving to attract attention to environmental threat cues, and thus facilitating the acquisition
of threatening information’ (Mathews, 1990, p. 461). Second, on the output side, anxiety motivates
a set of situation-specific risk minimization efforts and epistemic behaviors: anxiety's detection of a
potential threat prompts a combination of (potentially conscious) information gathering, situational
assessment, and higher cognitive processing (e.g., memory recruitment, reasoning, re-assessment)
that is aimed at helping us address the uncertain threat that we face. Christopher Hookway nicely
brings these points together:
By making me sensitive to risks and dangers, unreflectively alert to possible hazards,
anxiety may enable me to act spontaneously and effectively and prevent me [from]
carelessly exposing myself to unnecessary risks. The emotional state provides a tool
for collecting relevant information and planning actions in light of it… (Hookway,
1998, pp. 218–219).18
These initial observations allow us to draw out two further aspects of anxiety that will be important
for the discussion that follows. First, while we often talk of conscious experiences of anxiety, the
above indicates that it can also operate below the level of conscious awareness. More specifically,
since anxiety is a mechanism that combines a sensitivity and responsiveness to potential threats and
challenges, it is likely to manifest consciously only when some threshold of problematic uncertainty
has been met. Put another way, felt anxiety is an alarm that is triggered by instances of particularly
problematic uncertainty and that marks the associated ramping up of cognitive resources to address
it (Corr, 2008; Kurth, 2018b).19
17 For a more detailed discussion of anxiety's function and underlying cognitive architecture, see Kurth (2016, 2018b, chaps. 2–3),
Davis, Walker, Miles, and Grillon (2010), Öhman (2008), Corr (2008), Barlow (2001), Gray and McNaughton (2000), and Marks
and Nesse (1994).
18 To be clear, in claiming that anxiety can be beneficial, I do not deny it can lead to problems. Intense bouts (or deficits) of anxiety
can be disastrous. Rather, my aim is to draw out that even though anxiety can sometimes go awry, it—like other dimensions of our
emotional repertoire—often manifests in a moderate and beneficial manner: a twinge of concern about the situation at hand, not a
consuming worry about what might happen. In this way, anxiety is no different than, say, fear, anger, or joy: these emotions are good
things to have even though they can manifest in unfortunate ways (e.g., phobias, rage, manias). I return to this in §6. It is also worth
noting that this picture of anxiety as generally beneficial is widely endorsed by both social and clinical psychologists (e.g., Barlow,
2001; Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Marks & Nesse, 1994); it is gaining increasing attention among philosophers as well (e.g., Hookway,
1998; Kurth, 2015, 2016, 2018b; Nagel, 2010).
19 This picture of anxiety as a system that can recruit additional (cognitive, physiological) resources on an as-needed basis is thought
to be a general feature of emotions, not something specific to anxiety. See, for example, Lewis (2005), Levenson (1999).
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Second, though anxiety brings a general sensitivity and responsiveness to uncertainty, we also
find diversity in both the situations that provoke it, and the behaviors that subsequently result. For
instance, work by the psychologist Norman Endler indicates that tendencies to become anxious clus-
ter into (at least) three kinds of situations: situations where one faces the possibility of physical
harm, situations where one might face social evaluation or sanction, and situations whose novelty
or difficulty make one uncertain about what to do or what will happen (Endler & Kocovski, 2001).
Moreover, given the above observations about the value of anxiety, we should expect that the situa-
tional sensitivities identified by Endler will prompt corresponding behaviors that can help one
address the particular kind of uncertainty at hand. And we do. Anxiety felt in physically threatening
situations (e.g., being approached by a stranger in a dark parking lot) brings avoidance and escape
behaviors (Perkins & Corr, 2006). Individuals anxious about how they are being evaluated by others
tend to become more deferential and are more likely to try to make amends for social errors they
may have made (Leary & Kowalski, 1995). Finally, and as we will see in greater detail below, indi-
viduals who become anxious in the face of novel or difficult challenges engage in information gath-
ering, reassessment, and other epistemic behaviors as they try to figure out what to do (MacKuen,
Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010).
Taken together, these observations suggest both that the label “anxiety” picks out a family of
emotional responses that share a common core, and that these responses take on distinct forms in
order to help individuals address specific kinds of problems. In particular, we see that anxiety can
manifest in (at least) three distinctive ways. (1) There is a variety of “environmental” anxiety that
makes us aware and avoidant of the physical dangers that surround us. (2) There is a more interper-
sonally oriented “social” anxiety that prompts things like deference and caution in situations where
we are uncertain about how we are being evaluated by others. (3) There is a “practical” anxiety that
both helps us recognize that we face a novel or difficult decision, and that prompts epistemic behav-
iors aimed at helping resolve our underlying uncertainty.20
5.2 | Practical anxiety and uncertainty about what to do
The discussion so far identifies an emotion we can plausibly call practical anxiety. To help us both
further flesh out what anxiety of this sort amounts to, and demonstrate that it is a genuine psycho-
logical phenomenon, consider an example. Your mother's Alzheimer's has advanced dramatically in
the last year and you can no longer provide her with the care she needs. You are inclined to follow
the doctor's recommendation and put her in a nursing home. But this decision makes you anxious—
Is this really the right thing to do? Given your anxiety, you start to reflect on the details of the situa-
tion you face: your mother was always so concerned about elderly care facilities. Recalling this, you
now wonder: would she have thought that in a situation like this it would be inappropriate to put
her in a nursing home? In exploring this question, you are trying to sort out how best to reconcile
your mother's needs, fears, and desires. Still unsure, you decide to ask a close friend for guidance
and are prepared to revise your thinking about what to do based on your conversation.
In this example we see that your anxiety functions as a signal—it helps you see that you face the
challenge of figuring out how best to reconcile your mother's medical needs with her wish not to be put
in a nursing home. But your anxiety also generates epistemic behaviors aimed at helping you do this:
given your worries about what to do, you start thinking about the details of your mother's situation and
20 Are environmental, social, and practical anxiety distinct (natural) kinds or do they merely represent robust cultural modifications
of a more basic anxiety response? How we answer this will depend on thorny issues about, for example, the nature of (psychological)
kinds and the relationship between genes and culture. Fortunately, nothing in what follows turns on these issues. I discuss these issues
in Kurth (2016, 2018b).
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solicit input from those you trust. Your practical anxiety, in short, integrates (i) a sensitivity to novel and
difficult choices with (ii) epistemic behaviors that are driven by a concern to get things right.
While this case provides a familiar example of practical anxiety in action, it also allows us to better
understand how practical anxiety relates to recent work in dual-process theories of metacognition and
agency. Of particular note are the affinities that practical anxiety has with recent discussions of “episte-
mic” (or “metacognitive”) feelings (e.g., Arango-Muñoz, 2010; Nagel, 2010; Thompson, 2009; Proust,
2009; Hookway, 1998; c.f., Oppenheimer, 2008). Epistemic feelings are mechanisms of metacogni-
tion. In the language of dual-process theory, they are Type 1-like processes that (i) monitor and assess
mental states with regard to particular normative criteria (e.g., truth, accuracy, coherence) and that
(ii) generate feelings of (dis)fluency to the extent that the relevant normative criteria have (not) been
met. These assessments (and the associated feelings they bring) can then (iii) engage Type 2 mental
processing—prompting, for instance, reflection and reassessment in response to inconsistency or insuf-
ficient coherence. So understood, practical anxiety can be seen as one of the (likely many) epistemic
feelings that beings like us have. More specifically, practical anxiety is a metacognitive mechanism
that (a) is triggered by an assessment that some threshold of uncertainty about what to do has been
met, and that (b) tends to generate feelings of unease and associated epistemic behaviors (information
gathering, reflection, reassessment) aimed at resolving the uncertainty at hand (Kurth, 2015, 2016).
Understanding anxiety as a metacognitive mechanism that brings a sensitivity and responsiveness
regarding what the best course of action is also allows us to draw out an important difference between
practical anxiety and the social anxiety discussed above. As we saw, social anxiety is elicited in situa-
tions where one might be evaluated by others, and tends to bring defensive and self-interested
behaviors—deference, efforts to make excuses for one's faux pas, and the like. This suggests that, in
contrast to the concerns for accuracy that come with practical anxiety, social anxiety brings a more
ego-defensive set of motivations. So understood, social and practical anxiety are forms of anxiety that,
as metacognitive feelings, function to track and respond to different normative criteria. In the case of
social anxiety, the criterion concerns appropriate self-presentation and, when triggered, it brings a range
of ego-defensive responses (Leary & Kowalski, 1995). By contrast, for practical anxiety, the normative
criterion concerns good decision making and, when activated, it prompts open-minded forms of inquiry
and deliberation (Kurth, 2016, 2018b). Moreover, that these two varieties of anxiety engage different
normative criteria and associated motivations makes sense: practical anxiety's accuracy orientation fits
well with our understanding of it as a sensitivity to novel or difficult choices; social anxiety's ego-
defensive orientation meshes with our account of it as a sensitivity to being evaluated by others.
We get further support for our metacognitive account of practical anxiety and its accuracy orien-
tation from research by the political scientist Michael MacKuen (MacKuen et al., 2010). His work
investigates how feelings of anger and anxiety in response to a challenge to one's political policy
preferences affect one's subsequent actions and attitudes. To explore this question, MacKuen's team
developed a web-based environment that presented subjects with a (fake) news story about a
school's decision to change its affirmative action policy. The story was designed to either affirm or
challenge the policy preferences subjects had reported on a pretest questionnaire. The web-based
environment also provided subjects with the opportunity to explore, if they wished, additional infor-
mation that would affirm, challenge, or be neutral with regard to the news story they had read.21
21 MacKuen and colleagues talk generally about “anxiety,” not “practical anxiety” (that is a term I have coined). But as the discus-
sion in the text indicates, and as is readily apparent in their own presentation, they are picking out something very much like it—a
variety of anxiety focused on what to do in a novel/difficult situation. Of particular note for our purposes here is the fact that there
was little in the experimental design to make subjects think they were being observed or evaluated, and so little to suggest they were
experiencing social rather than practical anxiety.
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In the present context, the MacKuen experimental design is significant for three reasons. First, their
strategy of challenging their subjects' stances on affirmative action policy fits nicely with our focus on
difficult moral and practical decisions. After all, affirmative action is a policy that is supported—and
challenged—by independently plausible norms: equity norms say one should support affirmative action
efforts, while meritocratic norms tell one not to. Thus, the situation they focus on—a situation that raises
questions about whether one should continue to support (oppose) affirmative action—is a situation that
is likely to introduce the type of uncertainty about what to do that prompts practical anxiety. Second, by
creating an environment that can induce distinct emotions (anger or anxiety) and that provides subjects
with the opportunity to explore additional information sources, their experimental design provides a
rather direct test of the claim that practical anxiety engages accuracy-oriented epistemic behaviors that
help one work through uncertainty about what to do. Their results indicate that it does. Subjects for
whom the fake news story provoked anxiety sought out more information about affirmative action pol-
icy, were more interested in learning more about both sides of the issue, and were more willing to
explore new solutions. By contrast, those who experienced anger were less interested in informing them-
selves, and when they did seek out more information, they tended to just look at things that were in line
with their initial views about affirmative action policy. In short, these emotions ‘have a direct influence
over both attention and open-mindedness’—anxiety brings increases, anger does not (p. 455). Finally,
the different patterns of behavior we find between the anxious and the angry subjects suggest that these
emotions engage different underlying motivations. The open-minded inquiry we see in the anxious indi-
viduals points to an accuracy motivation—a desire to get it right. The more biased search of the angry
subjects, by contrast, suggests a more defensive orientation.22
The upshot, then, is that practical anxiety is a genuine and important feature of our psychology:
it functions as an alarm that helps us recognize situations where we face a particularly novel or diffi-
cult choice, and prompts deliberation, information gathering, reassessment, and the like that help us
better understand and navigate the situation at hand.23
22 For similar results regarding practical anxiety's role in initiating open-minded inquiry in the face of a novel/difficult choice, see
Valentino et al. (2008) and Brader (2006).
23 Though the discussion in the text has focused on the affinities that practical anxiety has with epistemic/metacognitive feelings, it is
also likely to have affinities with two other phenomena. First consider the discussion of epistemic vigilance in Sperber et al. (2010).
“Epistemic vigilance” refers to a set of capacities that are like practical anxiety in the sense that both are metacognitive tools that reg-
ulate reasoning and decision making. But the role that epistemic vigilance plays appears narrower insofar as it is posited as a set of
tools that helps individuals protect themselves from misinformation from others; practical anxiety, by contrast, concern decision mak-
ing uncertainty more generally.
Second, we can consider recent discussions of action selection fluency and disfluency (e.g., Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014;
Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Here the connection with practical anxiety is less clear. Selection (dis)fluency, in brief, is the feeling of
agency/control (or its absence) that is associated with the selection of a course of action. Fluent feelings are thought to be the upshot
of a lack of conflict in one's assessment of one's choice-options and so prospective evidence that one is making a “good” decision
about what to do. Feelings of disfluency, by contrast, are thought to result from conflict in one's assessment of the choice-options and
so evidence of a need for greater caution and attention with regard to one's decision making. Though work on selection disfluency
has, so far, emphasized its role as a detector of trouble, advocates suggest feelings of disfluency may also function to prompt more
strategic and controlled forms of mental processing (Haggard & Chambon, 2012, p. 392). So understood, feelings of disfluency are
likely to play an important role in the development and manifestation of expertise: these feelings are signals about problems with an
action or choice that can help one make real-time adjustments (we will return to this idea in §6.2).
With this overview in hand, we can make three observations about the relationship between practical anxiety and action selection dis-
fluency. (1) At a functional level, there are significant affinities between the two: both operate as alarms that, when triggered, increase
attention and prompt risk minimization/assessment efforts. (2) Moving beyond these functional similarities, neuroscientific research
indicates that the two mechanisms engage different neural structures: (practical) anxiety is associated with activation of the bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis (e.g., Avery, Clauss, & Blackford, 2016; Kurth, 2018b, chaps. 2–3), while selection disfluency is asso-
ciated with angular gyrus activation (e.g., Chambon et al., 2014). (3) Combining this pair of observations suggests two (potentially
compatible) accounts of the connection between practical anxiety and selection disfluency. First, selection disfluency might be one of
several inputs into practical anxiety: feelings of disfluency above a certain level of intensity indicate that an uncertainty threshold has
been met, thus engaging practical anxiety and the epistemic behaviors it provokes. Second, practical anxiety and selection disfluency
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6 | VINDICATING DELIBERATION
6.1 | Responding to the skeptic
Recall the two-fold challenge facing the proponent of deliberation: demonstrate that there is an
essential place for deliberation in our account of virtue, and do so while accommodating the empiri-
cal data underlying skepticism about the possibility of genuine practical deliberation. The response,
in brief, is this. Deliberation is essential to our ability to choose (and so behave) virtuously in the
face of difficult and novel situations. However, we can engage in such deliberation only because of
emotions like practical anxiety—emotions that both automatically signal that we face a difficult or
novel choice, and engage the genuine, open-minded deliberation that helps bring good practical
judgment.
Let us start with why deliberation is essential. As the above cases reveal, deliberation is crucial
when we face novel or difficult practical decisions. There are two reasons for this. First, in the face
of a hard/novel choice—Should I give more to those in need? What ought I do about my Alzhei-
mer’s-stricken mother?—we lack the knowledge and experience necessary to be guided by auto-
matic processes. Hence, the need to think and gather information about how to proceed. Second,
hard/novel cases involve both increased uncertainty and a greater possibility for error. So they are
situations where, as we have seen, we demand the cautious, well-informed (re)evaluation that comes
with careful deliberation (§4).
Bringing this into the context of Annas's proposal, we see that while she is correct that delibera-
tion can help us develop more efficiently as agents, its real value lies in helping us figure out what
to do when we face a difficult or new situation.24 Moreover, given that the situations where deliber-
ation is needed are ones involving both uncertainty about what to do and a demand for caution, we
should expect practical anxiety to be part of the explanation for how this deliberation is engaged—
practical anxiety, after all, is an emotion that is in the business of engaging (accuracy-oriented)
deliberation in the face of novel and difficult decisions (§5).
With this in mind, we can turn to the second chore: explaining how deliberation is engaged that
both (i) fits with the skeptic's observation that practical judgment starts from and is (largely) driven
by automatic processes, and (ii) explains why the resulting reason-giving behavior should be under-
stood as genuine, open-minded deliberation and not a motivated, post hoc rationalization of a deci-
sion one has already made.
Consider task (i). When confronted with the doctor's recommendation to put your mother in a
care facility, you started to deliberate. Moreover, you did so because of your anxiety. Given the
above account of practical anxiety's signaling function (§5), we can now see both why this is and
how it allows us to respond to the skeptic. Practical anxiety is an emotion—an automatic
mechanism—that both helps us recognize that we face a difficult decision, and that kicks us into
conscious deliberation to help us figure out what to do. It is a Type 1 mechanism that detects novel/
difficult situations and engages Type 2 processes to address what Type 1 mechanisms alone cannot
accomplish. Thus, we can agree with the skeptic that practical decision making is grounded in, and
driven by, automatic processes while nonetheless insisting there is an essential place for genuine
might represent distinct (but partially overlapping) uncertainty detection mechanisms: practical anxiety principally tracks and responds
to uncertainty about potential (physical, social) threats; selection disfluency is more oriented toward uncertainty regarding motor
behavior and physical action.
24 Other advocates of skill-based accounts of virtue have come to a similar conclusion (e.g., Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2004). But as we
will see (§7), these proposals remain vulnerable to Haidt/Doris-style skepticism.
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deliberation—helping us work through difficult choices when automatic mechanisms alone are not
enough.25
Turning to task (ii), does practical anxiety bring genuine deliberation? The above cases suggest
it does: your anxiety about both whether you were giving too much and what you should do for
your mother brought genuine epistemic behaviors that were aimed at helping you work through
those decisions. But one might be skeptical. After all, as intuitive as these cases are, they can only
do so much to establish that the reason-giving behavior practical anxiety tends to bring represents
genuine deliberation and not post hoc rationalization. To address this, we can return to the MacKuen
research. As we saw, individuals who were made anxious by the challenge to their affirmative action
beliefs were both more interested in learning more about both sides of the issue and more willing to
consider alternative proposals. Open-minded inquiry of this sort suggests these individuals were
engaged in a genuine effort to think through the challenge to their beliefs about affirmative action,
and not a motivated search for evidence that would help support their pre-existing views. That later
kind of behavior seems a better description of the individuals who became angry in response to the
challenge—not only were they less willing to explore new solutions, but they also tended to only
seek out information in line with their antecedent beliefs.
By bringing additional empirical support to our account of practical anxiety as a psychological
mechanism that kicks us in to genuine deliberation, the MacKuen results help undermine skepticism
about whether we ever engage in substantive deliberation. But we can do better. To see this, recall the
differences in motivational orientation that we observed between social and practical anxiety (§5).
Unlike the ego-defensive motivations associated with social anxiety, practical anxiety—as a response
provoked in the face of a novel/difficult decision—tends to bring a concern for accuracy. As such, it
(in contrast with social anxiety) is more likely to generate substantive, open-minded inquiry rather than
motivated, post hoc rationalizations. Recognizing this helps explain both when purported instances of
anxiety-provoked deliberation are likely to bring genuine reasoning, and why this is. Deliberation pro-
voked by practical anxiety will tend to be genuine because it is a metacognitive mechanism that is driven
by accuracy motivations. By contrast, “deliberation” provoked by social anxiety will more often take the
form of self-serving rationalizations because it is a mechanism that is shaped by ego-defensive concerns.
So while the skeptic may be right that we confabulate and engage in motivated, post hoc “deliberation,”
he is wrong to think we cannot explain when and why our reason-giving behavior is likely to be genu-
ine. With this, the two-fold challenge facing the deliberationist has been answered. Deliberation matters
for hard choices, and we can engage in it because of emotions like practical anxiety.26
25 Objection: The argument in the text presumes anxiety manifests in a particular way: an automatic (pre-conscious) appraisal signals
a difficult choice which then brings conscious deliberation. But reflection on anxious experience suggests a different picture: con-
scious ruminations and worries lead one to realize that one faces a difficult choice which then prompts additional conscious rumina-
tion and deliberation. But given that an adequate reply to the skeptic requires we have an automatic mechanism that prompts
deliberation, we have a problem: the conscious deliberation and reflection that anxiety brings is the upshot not of some automatic
mechanism, but rather conscious deliberation.Reply: While anxiety can come about through this alternative route, there is no reason
to think this is the only—or even the typical—way individuals become practically anxious. First, as we have seen (§5), empirical
work on the appraisal processes that prompt anxiety indicates that anxious episodes are typically the upshot of automatic, pre-
conscious mechanisms. Second, empirical work also suggests that in cases where reflection brings anxiety, this alternative causal
route is the upshot of specific (but atypical) triggers. For instance, clinical levels of self-monitoring appear to engage feedback mecha-
nisms that lead to anxiety-provoking levels of reflection (Barlow, 2001; Mor & Winquist, 2002).
26 Seeing that practical anxiety—and the deliberation it generates—is undergirded by accuracy motivations may have implications
beyond defending the deliberationist from Doris/Haidt-style skepticism. Though I cannot address the issue here, recognizing the
accuracy-oriented nature of practical anxiety suggests that Hugo Mercer and Dan Sperber's claim that the aim of reasoning is not (the
preservation of ) truth, but rather winning arguments (Mercer & Sperber, 2011) is too strong. While their claim may be true for rea-
soning generated in some—perhaps many—contexts, the discussion here suggests it is mistaken as a claim about deliberation gener-
ated by practical anxiety.
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6.2 | An objection
One might worry that the above conclusion is too hasty. After all, implicit in our defense of deliber-
ation is the assumption that practical anxiety can contribute to the good decision making characteris-
tic of virtuous agency. This claim may seem suspect. The anxious person is someone consumed,
even paralyzed, by intense anxiety. And given that anxiety is so unpleasant, one will do just about
anything to make it go away. If that is right, one might reasonably think anxiety-provoked delibera-
tion is likely to do more harm than good.
My response is two-fold. First, I suspect that what drives the thought that practical anxiety is
unhelpful comes from conflating it with related phenomena like social anxiety. As we have seen,
social anxiety brings an ego-defensive motivational orientation. So it is more likely to prompt rea-
soning that is motivated by self-interested concerns (e.g., a biased search for reasons aimed at pre-
senting oneself in a favorable light). By contrast, practical anxiety brings a concern for accuracy
and so typically engages the open-minded deliberation that helps protect against motivated reasoning
and other cognitive biases. Once we recognize that anxiety-provoked reasoning can be shaped by
these different motivations, the thought that practical anxiety will make us particularly susceptible
to pernicious forms of motivated reasoning fades. In fact, it is likely to engage the kind of construc-
tive reasoning we want. Notice as well that practical anxiety—as a sensitivity to uncertainty about
what to do in a novel or difficult situation—should be an emotion that we will tend to experience
less frequently as we gain experience and so become more competent (virtuous) as agents. But, cru-
cially, the need for practical anxiety will remain even for the most virtuous among us: as we have
seen (§4), for any level of human development, there will be times where we face new or hard
choice—so there will be times where we need the sensitivity to uncertainty and open-minded delib-
eration that practical anxiety brings.
Second, and more significantly, practical anxiety is a psychological capacity we can learn to use
more effectively. In this regard, it is no different than anger or fear—the value of these emotions is
enhanced as we learn to experience them at the right times and in the right ways. In the context of
practical anxiety, effective emotional regulation will involve learning to recognize when our unease
is the result of uncertainty about what the correct thing to do is (as opposed to uncertainty about,
say, whether we will be evaluated or embarrassed). This “cultivating” of practical anxiety will also
involve developing trust in the practical anxiety we feel and the open-minded deliberation it brings.
Clearly, more needs to be done to flesh this out. While I cannot do that here, three points are
worth noting. First, providing an account of emotion regulation is essential to any account of virtu-
ous agency—so in noting that we need to do this with regard to practical anxiety, we are not adding
anything new. But, second, the discussion here provides us with an initial understanding of what
cultivating anxiety is likely to involve. Consider, for instance, the research on feelings of disfluency
we discussed above in the context of anxiety as a mechanism of metacognition (§5.2). This work
suggests that learning to use practical anxiety more effectively (and so developing competency as an
agent) will involve becoming more attuned to, and trusting of, its signals—more sensitive to when
deliberation is needed and when we can be comfortable that we are making a good decision. Here
the role that feelings of (dis)fluency play in the development of sophisticated motor control and
skills (e.g., Murphy & White, 1978) offers an instructive model for thinking about how practical
anxiety (and our affective capacities more generally) can be tuned, and so become trusted, through
use (e.g., Railton, 2009; Railton, 2014). However, and this is the third point, (dis)fluency-driven reg-
ulation and learning is unlikely to be the whole story—for crucial to these models is the assumption
that one gets regular and timely feedback with regard to one's performance (e.g., Chambon et al.,
2014, pp. 1–5; Railton, 2009, pp. 108–109). While that is quite plausible for motor skills, it is less
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plausible regarding moral and practical decision making since here feedback is often less timely and
regimented. This means there is likely to be a need for learning mechanisms/techniques that can fill
the (feedback) gap. On this front, Annas's skill model offers one plausible strategy. Her emphasis on
instruction via examples that point to the underlying reasons for acting in a particular way suggests
one way we could augment our understanding of when practical anxiety is (in)appropriate: the
examples and accompanying reasons would, in a sense, serve as a proxy for more direct forms of
input—thus narrowing the feedback gap (Kurth, 2018a, 2018b, chap. 6).27
Taken together, these observations not only undermine the thought that when it comes to our
development as virtuous agents anxiety-provoked deliberation is bound to do more harm than good,
but they also help us understand how we can learn to trust, and so make better use of, our practical
anxiety.
7 | CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BETTER SKILL-BASED ACCOUNT
We have our response to the skeptic's challenge: deliberation is essential because automatic mecha-
nisms alone are not enough to help us work through novel and difficult decisions. That said, practi-
cal decision making is still very much grounded in, and driven by, automatic processes: routine
decisions often do not require conscious deliberation; and when deliberation is needed, it is engaged
via automatic mechanisms like practical anxiety. Moreover, we need not deny that much of our
reason-giving behavior is confabulatory. But we can insist that whether it is will turn on our under-
lying motivations—is it driven by a desire for accuracy or something else?
It is also worth emphasizing that in acknowledging the significance of practical anxiety, we do
not need to deny that Annas's skill model captures important features of virtue and its development:
learning is more efficient when it comes via examples and a drive to aspire; virtuous thought and
action can (often) be fluid, harmonious, and free of psychological conflict. The problem lies in
thinking that her version of the skill model captures all that matters. We have seen that it does not.
Emotions—both ones that are pleasant to experience and ones that are not—matter for our ability to
(learn to) be virtuous. We are virtuous, at times, because of the psychological conflict and anxiety
we experience.
Recognizing this suggests that if we are interested in a skill-based account of virtuous agency,
we are likely to do better if we move away from the two assumptions that bring trouble to Annas's
proposal: (i) skills and virtue acquisition must be the product of explicit instruction that gives one
the ability to explain why one did what they did, and (ii) once skills and virtue have been acquired,
all subsequent action is fluid, harmonious, and deliberation-free. In this regard, the skill-based
accounts we find in recent work from Peter Railton (2009), David Velleman (2008), and Herbert
and Stuart Dreyfus (1991) look quite promising. These proposals rely on less intellectualized
accounts of skill/virtue acquisition and they acknowledge that virtuous action can require delibera-
tion and reflection.28
27 For an alternative, more Kantian proposal, see Barbara Herman's discussion of the role that moral knowledge via “rules of moral
salience” play in one's development as a virtuous agent (1993, especially chap. 4). I say more about Herman's proposal in the context
of anxiety in Kurth (2018a, 2018b, chap. 5).
28 Brownstein (2014) argues that, like Annas, Railton and Velleman are committed to skilled/virtuous agents always being able to
articulate their reasons for acting one way rather than another, and so are just as vulnerable to the charge of over-intellectualization.
But Brownstein's argument relies on an uncharitable reading of the Railton and Velleman's proposals. They qualify their claims about
the extent to which agents will be able to explain their actions in a way that Annas does not, and so are not susceptible to Brown-
stein's charge of over-intellectualization.
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However, while these proposals may certainly avoid some of the problems that undermined
Annas's version of the skill model, they also lack the resources to answer the skeptic. The problem,
in short, is that while Railton, Velleman, and the Dreyfuses acknowledge the need for genuine delib-
eration, they say almost nothing about how it is engaged. For instance, Railton identifies ‘the ability
to detect, without reflecting and deliberating, conditions calling for reflection and deliberation’ as a
competency that we must have if we are to exhibit the reasons responsiveness that is characteristic
of human agency (Railton, 2009, p. 108). Similarly, Velleman maintains that much of human
agency is automatic in the sense of being free of conscious self-regulation. Yet he also holds that
our ‘capacity for [conscious] self-regulation remains in reserve in case it is needed’ (2008, p. 188).
For their part, the Dreyfuses note that ‘an expert facing a novel situation…, like a beginner, must
resort to [deliberation via] abstract principles’ (1991, p. 241). But in all three cases, we get little
beyond the providing of examples where it seems intuitively plausible that mechanisms of conscious
deliberation/reflection have been engaged.
But merely pointing to such examples is not enough. Because these examples provide no details
about the underlying psychological mechanisms—much less how they are engaged—what we get is
less an answer to our question than an illustration of what needs to be explained in the first place.
Thus, these proposals provide little that could be used in response to a skeptic who maintains that
these examples are not really examples of conscious deliberation, but rather just instances of confab-
ulation and post hoc rationalization.
Notice, however, that these difficulties go away if we incorporate a role for practical anxiety into
the moral psychology of these proposals. After all, it is an automatic mechanism that is in the busi-
ness of engaging conscious deliberation and reflection when automatic processes alone prove insuf-
ficient. So it is something Railton, Velleman, and the Dreyfuses can point to explain—in a manner
much like what we just did in §6—how genuine, nonconfabulatory deliberation can be engaged.
The upshot, then, is that if you are interested in a skill-based account of virtuous agency that can
silence the skeptic, you should build from a psychology that takes seriously the work that practical
anxiety can do.
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